Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in the one-month and three-month Libor. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank's ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In extremis, inter-bank markets can completely freeze.
Introduction
Extreme levels of inter-bank lending rates, particularly at longer maturities, were seen as a principal market friction of the …nancial crisis of 2007-09. Figure 1 shows that the spreads between London Interbank O¤er Rate (LIBOR) and Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rate for 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month terms increased to over 300 bps at the peak of the crisis compared to less than 10 bps before the crisis.
1 Figure 2 shows the weighted-average maturity of inter-bank term lending estimated by Kuo, Skeie, Youle and Vickery (2011) . 2 This work suggest that lending maturities fell from a peak average term of over 40 days before August 2007 to less than 20 days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 3 Such rising inter-bank term rates have been widely interpreted as a manifestation of rising counterparty risk of borrowing banks. However, during the crisis, banks with even the best credit quality borrowed in term markets at extremely high spreads to the risk-free rate, suggesting that lenders demanded heightened compensation for term lending even from relatively safe borrowers.
We provide an explanation of this rise in spreads and a collapse in maturities in the term inter-bank market by building a model of lending banks'precautionary demand for liquidity. Our key insight is that each bank's willingness to provide term lending (for a given counterparty risk of its borrower) is determined by its own rollover risk, which is the risk that it will be unable to roll over its debt that matures before the term of the loan. If adverse asset shocks materialize in the interim, debt overhang can prevent highly leveraged banks from being able to raise …nancing required to pay o¤ creditors. Thus, during times of heightened rollover 1 The LIBOR-OIS spread is a measure of the credit and liquidity term spread to the risk-free rate for inter-bank loans. LIBOR is a measure of banks' unsecured term wholesale borrowing rates. OIS is a measure of banks'expected unsecured overnight wholesale borrowing rates for the period of the …xed-for- ‡oating interest rate swap settled at maturity, where the ‡oating rate is the e¤ective (average) fed funds rate for the term of the swap. Figure 1: LIBOR-OIS spread, measured on the y-axis for 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month maturities. The spread was a primary measure of banking stress, increasing to over 300 bps at the peak of the crisis, in comparison to spreads of less than 10 bps before the crisis. Source: British Banker's Association and Bloomberg. Weighted average maturity is the average maturity of estimated term inter-bank issuance, weighted by maturity for terms between one week and one year.
risk, banks "hoard" liquidity by lending less and more expensively at longer term maturities. 4 Elevated rates for term borrowing, in turn, aggravate the debt overhang and rollover risk problems of borrowing banks. Even strong banks are forced to cut back on borrowing term and potentially bypass pro…table investments such as realsector lending for long-term and illiquid projects. 5 In the extremis, there can be a complete freeze in the inter-bank market, in the sense that there is no interest rate at which inter-bank lending will occur. In particular, even when banks with pro…table investment opportunities do not have solvency or liquidity risk, they may be unable to access liquidity on the inter-bank market if the lending banks have high enough short-term leverage and asset illiquidity. In these cases, paying lending banks their opportunity cost of liquidity renders borrowers' investments unpro…table. More generally, when the banking sector is weak (fewer pro…table investments, high uncertainty about asset quality and high short-term leverage), lenders'precautionary demand for liquidity manifests as low volumes and high rates in term inter-bank lending.
The key feature of our model -rollover risk of banks central to the inter-bank markets -was key to the ignition of the …nancial crisis of 2007-09. Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009) show empirically that the onset of the crisis in August 2007 was due to commercial bank exposures to o¤-balance sheet vehicles (conduits and SIVs).
These vehicles held securities (primarily, sub-prime mortgage backed) that were funded with extremely short-dated asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Hit by worsening house prices and the BNP Paribas' public announcement on August 8, 4 The Global Head of Loan Syndications & Trading for BNP Paribas explains that "many lenders intermix cost of risk and cost of funding whereas clearly they re ‡ect two very di¤erent elements. First, their own risk as perceived by their own lenders, and second the risk of the borrower -put another way, a poor quality borrower and a poor quality lender should result in a very high overall cost to the borrower, conversely the opposite would also apply." (van Kan, 2010) 5 We develop these ideas in a model that builds upon the asset-substitution or risk-shifting model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , Diamond (1989 Diamond ( , 1991 , and more recently, Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) . In essence, these papers provide a micro-economic foundation for the funding constraints of a leveraged …nancial …rm: the …rm can switch to a riskier, negative net present value investment ("loan") after borrowing from …nanciers. In anticipation, the …nanciers are willing to lend to the …rm only up to a threshold level of funding so as to ensure there is enough equity to keep the …rm's risk-shifting incentives in check.
2007 that sub-prime assets had become practically illiquid, the o¤-balance sheet vehicles -and, in turn, the commercial banks facing draw downs on credit lines provided to the vehicles -incurred signi…cant rollover risk. 6 It is equally interesting to contrast our analysis with the alternative view that borrowing rates and volumes in the inter-bank market are determined primarily by the credit risk of borrowers. Under this view, an increase in the credit risk of borrowing banks increases lending rates to compensate lenders for the higher risk and could also lead to reduced volumes. Our analytical framework predicts that spreads in term inter-bank markets can be larger, and volumes smaller, than ones based purely on borrower credit risk. At a minimum, this suggests caution in interpreting the entire rise in term inter-bank rates as being attributable to counterparty risk concerns. 7 Further, our model's most important and novel implication is that a 6 This risk of being unable to acquire short-term funding, in order to honor draw downs on credit lines backing the illiquid assets funded by ABCP, is equivalent to the more general risk for banks of being unable to roll over short-term borrowing against illiquid long-term assets.
7 Current research appears to have been unable to rationalize the extreme spreads in the interbank market as per this borrower-risk channel alone. While Williams (2008a, 2008b) bank's borrowing rate for a particular maturity in the inter-bank market increases with the credit risk and liquidity risk of its lender, controlling for the borrower's own credit risk. In the same vein, bilateral inter-bank markets can freeze even for some healthy borrowers when most other banks are leveraged, especially at short maturities, and are holding riskier and more illiquid assets. These implications are inconsistent with a pure borrower-risk view of inter-bank rates and volumes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our benchmark model of inter-bank lending supply and examines how asset illiquidity can lead to decreases in inter-bank lending. Section 3 extends the model to consider rollover risk and precautionary behavior on both supply and demand sides of the inter-bank market. Section 4 relates the results to existing empirical evidence, derives new empirical and policy implications, and discusses the related literature on liquidity hoarding by banks. Section 5 concludes. Details of proofs and analysis of the borrowing bank demand are contained in the appendix.
Liquidity hoarding
We build a model in which a bank with surplus liquidity either hoards it for its own future liquidity needs or lends the liquidity in the term inter-bank market to another bank that has additional capacity for investment in a long-term, illiquid asset. In Section 2.1, we introduce the benchmark model, in which the lending bank has existing risky assets and short-term debt in place. We show as a benchmark that absent any frictions, the lending bank's own credit risk and leverage do not lead the bank to hold any liquidity. The bank supplies its full liquidity for term inter-bank lending. In Section 2.2, we add a moral hazard problem for the lending bank aimed at capturing opacity and illiquidity of banking assets and activities. The illiquidity of the lending bank's assets decreases its ability to roll over its short-term debt.
attribute the large one-month and three-month LIBOR-OIS spreads (as shown in Figure 1 Because of this, the lending bank retains liquidity to pay o¤ short-term debt rather than lend on the term inter-bank market. Term inter-bank lending may thus fall relative to the benchmark amount even in the absence of credit risk of the borrowing bank.
Benchmark model of the term inter-bank market
There are three periods, dates t = 0; 1; 2; and two types of banks i = B; L. At date 0, each bank has in place investment in one unit of a long-term asset that pays at date 2 y with probability ; corresponding to success of the investment, and zero otherwise, corresponding to failure of the investment. Thus, the expected return on the asset is y 1. (In Section 3, we will allow to be a random variable that is realized at date 1 to allow for the partial revelation of information ex-interim).
Bank i = B is called the "borrowing bank" because it has an opportunity at date 0 for additional investment of up to one unit into the long-term asset but has no additional liquid goods, which we call "liquidity,"required for the investment. The bank also does not have any additional borrowing sources from outside depositors (at least not in the very short term).
To start with, the focus of the model is on bank i = L, called the "lending bank."
At date 0, this bank has an additional unit of liquidity but has no opportunity for additional investment in the long-term asset. The bank lends l 1; which is a two-period term inter-bank loan, to the borrowing bank at a term interest rate of r and stores liquidity (1 l) for a rate of return of one for one period. The borrowing bank invests the two-period term inter-bank loan amount that is borrowed into the long-term asset and repays the loan at date 2 with probability .
At date 1, the lending bank has to repay short-term debt L 2 [1; 2] held by depositors. 8 The bank can repay the debt with liquidity it holds, (1 l); and by 8 The amount L re ‡ects the lending bank's e¤ective short-term leverage in place. This leverage can alternatively be thought of as a broader type of liquidity need, such as the draw-down of the bank's extended credit lines to corporations or special purpose vehicles. At the minimum value of L , the bank has su¢ cient liquidity to repay all short-term debt at date 1. At the maximum value of L , the bank's one unit of the long-term asset in place is entirely …nanced by short-term debt.
issuing new debt to depositors with a face amount f L due at date 2. The bank defaults if it cannot repay or roll over its debt, in which case the proceeds of the bank's asset-in-place and inter-bank loan have no salvage value to either the bank's depositors nor itself. 9 Depositors must break even on their expected return f L to be willing to roll over debt
For a given term inter-bank market rate r; the bank chooses (i) date 0 term lending l and (ii) date 1 borrowing with face amount f L (due at date 2) in order to maximize its expected pro…t
subject to constraint (1) . The optimal values l and f L satisfy the …rst order condition and the depositor rationality constraint, respectively. Substituting from
(1), expected pro…t can be written as
The lending bank's solution is to lend fully, l = 1; at any term rate r 1 : This gives the bank a risk-adjusted expected rate of return at least that of storage, r 1: The bank lends nothing otherwise, l = 0 for r < 1 .
Next, we consider a simpli…ed term inter-bank loan demand by a borrowing bank. The borrowing bank maximizes expected pro…ts by borrowing a full unit at any term rate below the rate of return on investment, so as to increase investment in the asset in place. In other words, the borrowing bank has a perfectly elastic demand to borrow at any term rate that is below the rate of return that investment pays, b (r) = 1 for r y, and does not borrow otherwise, b (r) = 0 for r > y. To summarize, with no frictions, the lending bank in equilibrium fully lends its liquidity at any positive expected rate of return. For < 1; credit risk of the borrower is re ‡ected in the term lending rate in the inter-bank market of r = 1 > 1 but does not a¤ect term inter-bank lending volume.
Chooses inter-bank loan l Holds liquidity (1 -l) and asset-in-place rollover default risk-shifting no risk-shifting
Figure 3: Lending Bank Timeline. The timeline shows for the benchmark model with agency problems the lending bank's choice of inter-bank loan l at date t = 0; choice of whether to risk-shift, conditional on short-term debt L being successfully rolled over at date t=1; and payo¤s at date t=2. With probability , the inter-bank loan pays rl, and if there is no risk-shifting the asset-in-place pays y and the bank pays short-term debt f L . If there is risk-shifting, there is an expected return of k L .
Illiquidity of assets
The timeline of the benchmark model with illiquid assets is shown in Figure 3 .
Speci…cally, we add two agency problems for the surplus bank. One, we assume that the lending bank can risk-shift its assets. After the bank rolls over its short term debt at date 1, the bank can costlessly and unveri…ably increase the risk, while decreasing the expected return, of the asset in place. Speci…cally, the bank can receive a bank-speci…c, higher payo¤ y L R > y, which occurs when the asset investment is a success and has a positive payo¤. This higher payo¤ comes at the cost of a lower probability of payo¤ L R < that is uncorrelated with . Riskshifting decreases the expected return:
10 The common payo¤ y re ‡ects systematic risk; the bank-speci…c payo¤ from risk-shifting re ‡ects idiosyncratic risk.
Two, we assume that the lending bank cannot pledge any returns of the interbank loan. In particular, we assume that depositors have limits on the information they can verify about the lending bank's three types of assets, depending on their opacity. First, inter-bank loans are the most opaque assets to depositors. The lending bank itself can verify returns on its inter-bank loan, re ‡ecting its ability for peer monitoring. However, the depositors of the lending bank cannot verify any information about the returns of the inter-bank loan because they are the furthest removed from the borrowing bank's assets that ultimately back the inter-bank loan.
Second, the asset in place is held directly by the lending bank and is less opaque to the bank's depositors than inter-bank loan is. The depositors can verify whether the return on the asset in place is positive or zero, but cannot distinguish between whether a positive return is y or y L R : 11 Third, liquidity held by the bank is perfectly veri…able by depositors, and can be paid out to depositors at date 1.
An increase in term lending by the bank decreases the liquidity (1 l) that is available to pay depositors at date 1. However, since returns on inter-bank loans are fully internalized by the lending bank, it would not attempt to increase the risk of these returns. This, however, is not the case for the bank's incentives to increase the risk of the asset in place. Consider the four possible states for the lending bank under risk-shifting on the asset in place, conditional on the bank …rst rolling over its short-term debt. For each state, the date 2 payo¤s of the asset in place and term inter-bank loan, the state probability, and the lending bank's pro…t are as follows:
Asset in place Inter-bank loan State probability Pro…t
11 See Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) for a related model showing that debt with liquidation rights is the optimal contract in presence of risk-shifting and coarseness of veri…able information on asset payo¤s. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) also explain optimality of demandable debt in models with moral hazard and hold-up problems.
The expected pro…t from risk shifting conditional on rolling over debt is thus
The lending bank's incentive compatibility constraint requires that pro…ts without risk-shifting given by equation (2) are greater than pro…ts with risk-shifting given by equation (3). This incentive constraint can be written as
and it holds if and only if the probability of asset payo¤ is large enough that new
: For tractability, we assume the risk-shifting payout y L R to the lending bank increases as the probability of success L R decreases. In the limit, as
where k L equals the expected return of the risk-shifting assets. The value k L is our measure of the illiquidity of the asset in place. We also refer to k L as the severity of the moral hazard problem.
It is equivalent to an amount of expected pro…ts at date 2 that cannot be pledged at date 1. Under this limiting case, the incentive constraint (4) can be rewritten as
The bank's rollover constraint requires both the incentive constraint (5) and individual rationality constraint (1) to hold, which can be combined into a constraint on the amount of term inter-bank lending:
Hence, the bank's optimal choice of new debt f L must be small enough to satisfy the incentive constraint (5), which according to the depositor rationality constraint 12 Recall that the payo¤ to the lending bank on the inter-bank loan lr that occurs with probability is unveri…able to depositors and is not used to repay depositors. Hence, the lender only repays f L from the payo¤ y L R of its assets in place.
(1), limits the amount of term lending such that the bank does not risk-shift. It follows that Lemma 1. Term inter-bank lending is constrained to be less than one unit, l < 1; if leverage plus moral hazard costs are greater than the expected return on investment:
Now, the rollover condition requires the bank inelastically to hold liquidity (1 l ) in order to avoid interim liquidation and loss of payo¤s at date 2. This is true for all term inter-bank lending rates r 1 that are on a risk-adjusted basis greater than or equal to the rate on storage. Indeed, the rollover condition may imply complete withdrawal by the lender from the term inter-bank market, that is, l = 0; regardless of the term inter-bank rate. 13 In this extreme case, the lending bank has to hold all of its liquidity to repay short-term debt, according to equation (6): For parameters such that L + k L > 1 + y; a term lending freeze occurs.
The alternative view: Counterparty risk
The traditional view of spreads in term inter-bank rates over the risk-free rate is that of compensation to lenders for counterparty (borrower) credit risk. Throughout the crisis, however, many empirical studies (see footnote 7) questioned whether counterparty credit risk alone could explain spreads in the term inter-bank market and suggested liquidity factors were at play. Our model explains these liquidity spreads as arising due to lenders'demand driven by their own credit risk for holding liquidity to meet their future obligations.
Speci…cally, consider in our model the case of borrower credit risk, with no other 13 It is worth observing which of the two agency problems plays a critical role in the model. We show in the online appendix that the minimum assumption necessary is that returns on inter-bank loans are not fully veri…able, which captures the illiquidity of inter-bank lending. If instead, the lending bank could fully borrow against its inter-bank loans when rolling over debt, then increasing the inter-bank loan would help to relax the bank's rollover constraint and to increase its pro…ts. This holds for any pro…table rate r > 1 ; regardless of the extent of moral hazard k L : Moral hazard can, however, increase the threshold rate r necessary for the bank to meet the rollover constraint. Additionally, when there is opacity of the inter-bank loan, the decrease in inter-bank lending is exacerbated by moral hazard.
frictions. In this setting, the lender lends its full liquidity unit, l = 1; at a term rate r = 1 to cover the credit risk of the borrower, which is represented by (1 ):
Hence, the term lending rate adjusts to the borrower's credit risk, but there is no e¤ect on the quantity of term inter-bank lending.
In contrast, our model shows that if the lender's leverage ( L ) and asset illiquidity (moral hazard k L ) are large enough, then the lender may decrease the volume of term lending to less than a full unit.
Indeed, the lender may hold all of its liquidity to pay o¤ short-term debt because it cannot roll over any amount of it. But provided that the lender lends, the rate is r = 1 : In other words, the term lending rate adjusts to the borrower's credit risk, but the quantity of term lending is determined by the lender's credit risk.
Precautionary behavior
In this section, we consider banks'precautionary demand for liquidity. We enrich the model with partial information revelation regarding the credit risk of assets in place, ex-interim at the time that short-term debt is due. This creates rollover risk, or in other words, uncertainty about the ability of the bank to roll over its short-term debt. Under the richer model, the liquidity demand of the lending bank takes a precautionary nature, in that the bank holds liquidity to reduce its rollover risk. Precautionary liquidity not only decreases term inter-bank lending, even in the absence of credit risk of the borrower, but also increases the term equilibrium interbank rate spread above the credit risk spread. Also, there is lower term inter-bank lending in equilibrium compared to the benchmark.
Rollover risk
We continue to use l to denote the term lending volume and r to denote the term rate, respectively. For brevity, at times we omit the word 'term'and simply refer to l as inter-bank lending and r as the inter-bank rate. To introduce rollover risk, we now assume that the asset payo¤ probability is a random variable that is realized at date 1, where has a distribution G( ) and density g( ) > 0 over [ ; ]. We de…ne^ L (l) as the bankruptcy cuto¤ value for the lending bank such that for a large enough realization ^ L (l); the rollover constraint (6) holds:
where k L y: The following lemma shows that the rollover risk for the bank increases in leverage L and the severity of moral hazard k L :
Lemma 2. The lending bank cannot roll over its debt at date 1 if its probability of default is less than its bankruptcy cuto¤ value:
The cuto¤ value^ L ;
and hence the bank's rollover risk, is increasing in leverage L ; the severity of moral hazard k L , and the inter-bank lending amount l; and is decreasing in the payo¤ of the asset y and liquidity held (1 l).
Subject to the rollover constraint, the bank's optimization is to maximize expected pro…ts, which are given by
For an interior solution l (r) 2 (0; 1), the …rst order condition is
The left-hand side of this condition gives the bene…t of a marginal increase in lending, which is the expected rate of return to the bank on the inter-bank loan whenever the bank survives the asset shock at date 1. The right-hand side of the condition gives the cost of lending at the margin, which is the marginal increase in bankruptcy
; applied to the illiquidity of the asset in place, k L , and the expected 14 We can con…ne our analysis to considering^ Intuitively, the lending bank holds precautionary liquidity to reduce the rollover risk on its short-term leverage arising from illiquidity of the asset in place. The rollover risk materializes whenever there is adverse information revelation in the ex-interim period about the asset quality. The induced precautionary demand for liquidity reduces the bank's supply of inter-bank lending. 15 
Inter-bank market freeze
In the appendix, we derive the borrowing bank's demand in the inter-bank market, b (r), when also facing a risk-shifting problem with short-term debt, analogous to the lending bank's optimization for l (r). For the analysis in this section, we simply assume the properties of b (r) that are derived in the appendix: The borrowing demand b (r) 2 (0; 1) is decreasing in the inter-bank rate r; the borrowing bank's short-term leverage B ; and the severity of its moral hazard k B . Also, the bank does not borrow at an interest rate greater than the return on the asset: b (r > y) = 0:
Consider …rst the case of no leverage or moral hazard costs for the borrowing bank, B = k B = 0. In this case, the borrowing bank has a perfectly elastic demand to borrow at a rate that is not greater than the rate of return that investment pays:
b (r) = 1 for r y, and b (r) = 0 for r > y. 15 Recall that when there are no agency problems or rollover risk as in the benchmark model, inter-bank lending helps to meet the lending bank's leverage payments since a part of the borrowing bank's investment opportunity is pledgeable to the lending bank's creditors. However, with agency problems and rollover risk, an increase in inter-bank lending at a given rate exacerbates the lending bank's di¢ culty in meeting its leverage payments.
Consider also for sake of illustration a uniform distribution of g( ) on the interval
[ ; ]. Then, there is an explicit solution for the lending bank's problem:
For parameters such that r(0) > y; a lending freeze occurs. In a lending freeze, the lending bank does not supply any amount of the inter-bank loan at an interest rate below the rate of return on the investment assets because the lending bank prefers to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons rather than to lend. Formally, equation (10) implies that r(0) > y i¤
which is satis…ed whenever the lending bank's leverage L and moral hazard cost k L are su¢ ciently large. Figure 4 illustrates such an inter-bank lending freeze.
Next, consider the general case including rollover risk and moral hazard costs for the borrowing bank, that is, with positive B and k B : The condition for a freeze in the inter-bank market in this case is
under which there is no interest rate at which inter-bank lending will occur. Such a freeze can also arise at interest rates r < y since the borrowing bank too is concerned about its own ability to roll over short-term debt and reduces borrowing as the interest rate in the inter-bank market rises.
Inter-bank market stress
More broadly, in an interior equilibrium the amount of inter-bank lending is less than a full unit and is lower if the lending bank or the borrowing bank is more It is also the case that as moral hazard or leverage increases for the lending bank, the equilibrium inter-bank rate increases. Conversely, as the moral hazard problem becomes more severe or leverage increases for the borrowing bank, its demand for term borrowing decreases, which drives the inter-bank rate down. 
The alternative view: Counterparty risk
Consider again the contrast of our model with the traditional view of spreads in interbank rates as based solely on counterparty (borrower) credit risk. With rollover risk and induced precautionary desire to hold liquidity, the lender requires an interest rate spread above the rate adjusted for the borrower's credit risk: r >
The lender requires this spread to compensate it for the risk of not being able to roll over its short-term debt. This spread increases in the lender's leverage, its asset illiquidity, and uncertainty about its asset quality.
The increased spread charged by the lender induces the borrowing bank to reduce its demand for inter-bank borrowing, as it faces its own rollover risk. At higher rates, the borrower …nds it less worthwhile to make long-term investments at the expense of taking on rollover risk and cuts back borrowing. Viewed another way, the borrower too exhibits precautionary hoarding since it e¤ectively maintains more liquidity for itself by borrowing less to fund long-term projects. As in the case of the lender, the borrower's precautionary behavior is stronger as its leverage, asset illiquidity, and asset risk rise.
Empirical predictions and relevance of results
Our analytical results on hoarding of liquidity by banks and its e¤ect on interbank rates are corroborated by empirical …ndings in the extant literature. Further, the model also provides testable implications for teasing out borrower (demand) and lender (supply) e¤ects in inter-bank markets. The precautionary liquidity view provides ground for new policy insights. Moreover, the precautionary basis for liquidity hoarding sits in contrast to the conventional basis for liquidity hoarding based on strategic reasons. We discuss these points in turn.
Extant empirical evidence
The empirical literature on the inter-bank market predominantly examines the overnight market, which we …rst examine. We then contrast this literature with the emerging empirical literature on term inter-bank markets.
Liquidity hoarding and inter-bank markets
Acharya and Merrouche (2009) States during the crisis: to insure themselves against intraday liquidity shocks, weaker banks facing heightened rollover risk held larger reserve balances. In particular, they report that banks sponsoring ABCP conduits witnessed increased payments shocks, and that greater payments shocks led to an increase in bank's reserves.
In addition, banks appear to have responded to higher uncertainty about payments during the crisis by becoming more reluctant to lend excess reserves to other banks when reserves were high. These results are also suggestive of a precautionary demand for liquidity and are entirely consistent with Lemma 3. 
Overnight versus term inter-bank markets

Novel empirical predictions
Our model also o¤ers several new testable implications:
First, Lemma 3 shows that a bank's lending rate for a particular maturity in the inter-bank market increases with its own credit risk (e.g., balance-sheet leverage), illiquidity of assets (e.g., holding of complex assets) and rollover risk (e.g., nature of leverage -uninsured or wholesale deposits relative to insured or retail deposits), controlling for the credit risk of the counterparties that borrow. More uniquely to our model, Proposition 2 shows that a bank's borrowing rate for a particular maturity in the inter-bank market increases with credit risk, illiquidity and rollover risk of the lender, controlling for the borrower's own credit risk. 16 Second, our model suggests tests that combine inter-bank rates and volumes. An increase in the lender or borrower bank's leverage drives down the bank's lending supply or borrowing demand for loans, respectively, which decreases the amount of inter-bank lending (Proposition 1). An increase in the lender leverage, however, increases the equilibrium inter-bank rate; in sharp contrast, an increase in the bor- 16 In the model, we assume that banks act competitively, yet we recognize that inter-bank markets are often segmented and that banks may not interact with all others. We model this by considering individual borrower-lender pairs, in which both banks act as price-takers. An equilibrium inter-bank rate thus depends on the lender's supply curve and hence the lender's characteristics. Empirically, our model suggests that a rate at which a bank borrows depends on the characteristics of the lending bank.
rower leverage decreases the equilibrium inter-bank rate (Proposition 2). A joint analysis of inter-bank rates and volumes can thus help tease out the e¤ects of lender supply versus borrower demand shifts. To the best of our knowledge, such joint analysis of inter-bank rates and volumes with borrower and lender …xed e¤ects (or characteristics) has not yet been conducted. All of these tests should hold if we replaced borrower or lender leverage with asset illiquidity. Third, our model suggests that an increase in the risk of asset-level shocks increases term inter-bank rates, and reduces term inter-bank volumes. This is not just due to an increase in the borrower's credit risk. It is also due to an increase in the rollover risk of the lender, as in Propositions 1 and 2. That is, term inter-bank rates and volumes should contain an interaction e¤ect between risk (e.g., realized or implied market volatility, as re ‡ected in the VIX) and both borrower and lender leverage and rollover risk. 17 Finally, our results indicate that measures of inter-bank market rates such as LIBOR do not necessarily indicate the full breakdown that may occur in the interbank market since there is no coincident provision of information on volumes. When there is a complete breakdown of terms between some borrowers and lenders, the inter-bank rate between some parties is not even well-de…ned. Rates based on actual or quoted transactions may mask the breakdown in some parts of the market, understating the market average rate. Hence, measurement and reporting of volumes in term inter-bank markets is crucial for understanding the stress and collapse in these markets. 18 17 Fur…ne (2010) …nds that the LIBOR-OIS spread is related to VIX over time, supporting our prediction, and results could be further tested by examining separate borrower and lender e¤ects. 18 Documenting transaction volumes that go with one, three and six month LIBOR rates is potentially also important as they are used to index over $360 trillion of notional …nancial contracts, as estimated by the British Bankers'Association (BBA), ranging from interest rate swaps and other derivatives to ‡oating-rate residential and commercial mortgages.
Policy conjectures
It is important to consider cases where the lending banks'precautionary demand for liquidity may be excessive relative to its socially e¢ cient level. In turn, this would However, a resolution authority to address weak banks' leverage and rollover risk would be a robust intervention also under this alternative view.
Related literature
There is a growing body of theoretical literature on inter-bank markets. Our focus is on the positive implications for the terms (quantity and interest rates) of liquid-ity transfers in inter-bank markets when banks have short-term leverage and face attendant agency problems. Hence, we restrict discussion of the related literature on this theme. 19 Rollover risk in our model induces banks to hold liquidity and raise inter-bank rates or withdraw liquidity altogether from inter-bank markets. The literature has also explored other motives for banks'desires to hold liquidity in crises. Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2008) While these papers focus on aggregate liquidity shortages and strategic or behavioral demand for liquidity by bank(er)s, we derive instead a precautionary demand for liquidity by (weak) banks as contributing to heightened borrowing costs for (even safe) banks. In a contemporary paper, Gale and Yorulmazer (2010) model both the precautionary and the strategic motive for holding cash and show that banks may hoard liquidity and lend less than the maximum possible amount, as in our model.
In our paper as well as in these other papers, a common theme is that the increase in bank propensity to hold liquidity is in anticipation of crises, rather than (just) upon their incidence. Diamond and Rajan (2005) also show how asset liquidations by some banks can ex post reduce the endogenous amount of aggregate liquid resources available to even fundamentally healthy banks. The contagion in their paper also operates through an increase in inter-bank market rates and results in a decrease in lending to the real sector. This is, however, an ex post contagion rather than an ex ante one that is in anticipation of insolvency or rollover risk (as in our model).
Concluding remarks
Stress and freezes in term inter-bank lending markets can be explained by rollover risk of highly leveraged lenders and illiquidity of assets underlying term loans. We showed that the term inter-bank lending rates and volumes are jointly determined, re ‡ecting the precautionary demand for liquidity of lenders and aversion of borrowers to trade at high rates of interest, both induced by their respective rollover risks. The model's implications are consistent with several empirical papers that study interbank activity during …nancial crises.
The primary message from our analysis is that heightened rates and reduced volumes in inter-bank markets should not necessarily be interpreted as being caused solely by counterparty credit risk. These phenomena may re ‡ect the reluctance of banks to give up liquidity for long maturities, or conversely, their precautionary demand for liquidity.
Analysis following Lemma 1. Consider the case where the lending bank can fully pledge returns on the inter-bank loan, but the bank still faces the moral hazard problem on the asset in place. The bank's expected pro…t under no risk shifting is
The individual rationality constraint for the bank's depositors is
For any lending rate r 1 ; an increased quantity of lending l relaxes the rollover constraint. The bank prefers to lend its full liquidity. For parameters such that the rollover constraint does not hold for l = 1 at a given lending rate r; the bank will default at date 1 regardless of its inter-bank lending. The rate requirement for the bank to to be able to roll over its debt is r
which is increasing in the severity of the bank's moral hazard, k L :
In contrast, consider the case where the lending bank cannot pledge returns on the inter-bank loan. Instead, suppose there is no moral hazard problem:
The rollover constraint is given by l y L + 1 and is tightened by increased lending l: The bank does not lend its full liquidity if L > y: Moreover, for the case of moral hazard case, when k L > 0; the quantity of lending declines linearly in k L ;
as seen by the rollover constraint (6).
Assumption 1. We make two assumptions that ensure that the second order condition is satis…ed. First, we assume a uniform distribution for g( ), which is always su¢ cient to satisfy the condition needed for g 0 (^ L ) to be not too small.
This ensures that the lending bank has a minimal enough increase in its marginal bankruptcy risk for marginal increases in its bankruptcy cuto¤ value^ L . Second, we assume large enough parameters for k L and L relative to y such that
Proof of Lemma 3. To study the second order condition of lender's optimization problem, note that
For g 0 (^ L ) 0; which is satis…ed by a uniform distribution for g( ); condition (13) is su¢ cient for
we can see that lending is increasing in r; since
0;
where the last inequality holds since l 1 < y: Lending is decreasing in L ; since
which is satis…ed by condition (13) . Lending is also decreasing in
which is always satis…ed for l 1 and r y; the borrowing bank demand is never positive for r > y, which can be excluded:
Proof of Proposition 2 and 3. In equilibrium, l (r ; x) = b (r ; x) and hence 
Now, 
For x = k L ; as shown above, 
In the limit as 
Subject to the incentive constraint holding, the depositors' individual rationality constraint for rolling over the short-term debt amount
The rollover constraint depends on both the incentive constraint (27) and individual rationality constraint (30) holding:
We de…ne^ B (b) as the bankruptcy cuto¤ value for the lending bank such that for 
The rollover risk for the borrowing bank increases in leverage B and the severity of moral hazard k B :
Assumption B-1. We assume large enough moral hazard k B and not too large leverage B such that the bankruptcy cuto¤ is increasing in borrowing, 
For an interior solution b (r) 2 (0; 1); the …rst order condition is
The LHS of the FOC gives the bene…t of a marginal increase in borrowing, which is equals the expected rate of return on investing in the asset minus the rate of return on borrowing, conditional on the borrowing bank meeting its liquidity rollover needs at date 1. The RHS of the FOC gives the cost, which is the increase in bankruptcy risk, g(^ B ) is decreasing in the inter-bank rate r; leverage B ; and the severity of moral hazard
@^
Proof. To study the second order condition, for g 0 ( ) = 0; 
For r y; 
